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e National Treatment Requirements of the Berne 
d Universal Copyright Conventions 
rt One 
tes are constantly engaged in the process of revising or amending their 
·ght laws to cope with the pressures of new technologies and the 
nds of various classes of persons or entities who wish to acquire new 
over copyright works. Since most states are now parties to either or 
the Revised Berne Convention (RBC) and the Universal Copyright 
ention (UCC), they are aware that any reform of their laws must com-
with the obligations imposed by these Conventions. Currently the United 
tesi which is bound only by the UCC, is considering what changes may be 
essary to its law in order that it may accede to the RBC and thus gain the 
oved international protection provided by the latter Convention.1 In all 
cases, an important preliminary question states must face is: how far are 
bound to extend the benefit and protection of their copyright law in 
ur of other members of either Convention? 
.*, B; A., LL. B. (Hons.) (Auckland), J. D. (Chicago); Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, Toronto. 
I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and to 
Dean John D. McCamus of Osgoode Hall Law School for providing me with leave time in 
1985-1986 to undertake the research leading to this study. I am also grateful to the follow-
ing for reading various drafts of the manuscript and making helpful suggestions: Professor 
Reuben Hasson of Osgoode Hall Law School; Professors A. J. McClean and D. M. McRae 
of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia; and Professor Victor Nabhan of the 
Faculte de Droit, Universite Laval, Quebec. 
r footnote 1 see next page. 
VCH Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, D-6940 Weinheim, 1986 0018-9855/86/0510-0577$02.50/0 
578 Vaver 
At first sight, the matter seems easily resolved. Like the other great 
tion on a cognate subject-matter concluded around the same · 
Berne Convention (BC), the Paris Union for International Pro 
Industrial Property,2 the fundamental principle of the BC since its i 
in 1886 has been that of national treatment, "the complete ass' · 
foreigners to nationals, without condition of reciprocity" .3 With 
revision, states have undertaken to provide certain minimum· st 
protection in addition to the fundamental requirement of national 
but the latter principle has remained constant. The same is true of 
except that the minimum standards of protection are fewer. How 
demands of new technology and new classes of creative people and 
tions have caused states to grant or consider granting new rights to 
of works not necessarily envisaged by the Conventions. 
The question that this study addresses is: what "works" and what "ri 
subject to the RBC and the UCC? 
The matter is far from academic. Some countries, typically net expo 
copyright material such as the United States, have no hesitation when 
ing a new copyright law in generally extending its benefit for all works 
rights to nationals or domiciliaries of UCC states.4 Other countries, 
net importers of copyright material, carefully weigh whether to ext 
tection to foreign nationals at all, and if so, whether on the basis off 
1 See "Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the 
Convention (December 31, 1985)" (henceforth "Preliminary Report"), inviting c 
preparatory to the issue of a final report. 
2 LADAS, "Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights: National and International Pr 
(1975, Harvard U.P.), vol. 1, at 271; BEIER, "One Hundred Years oflntemationalC 
ation - The Role of the Paris Convention in the Past, Present and Future" 15 IIC 1, at 
(1984). 
3 LADAS, "The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property" (1938, Ma 
N.Y.), at 365. See also WIPO, "Guide to the Berne Convention for the Prate 
Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971)" (Geneva, 1978), p. 32 ("WIPO 
(note that the Guide is merely an explanation, not an authentic interpretation, of the 
id., at 4). 
4 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. s. 104(b)(l), (2). The Semiconductor Chip Protection 
of 1984, appended as Chapter 9 of the Copyright Act, however rejects this prin · 
favour of reciprocity (17 U.S.C. s. 902(a)(l), 914). One reason for rejecting n 
treatment was the fear that U.S. works would not be protected in other countries, and' 
interest of the United States in establishing a reasonable system of domestic protection 
mask works is paramount": House Report No. 98-781 (98th Cong., 2d Sess., 1984), p; 
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ocity, normally attracting national treatment, or material reciprocity. 5 
he primary beneficiaries of the rights may well end up being foreigners 
er far from their minds. 
rprisingly, many states are reluctant voluntarily to create a situation 
e their nationals benefit little or less than foreign nationals. Occasion-
negative forces such as xenophobia steer a state away from according 
rtal treatment, but more often considerations of cultural and economic 
alism provide the motivation. States wishing to reinforce their own 
e look naturally to extending protection only to their own authors and 
al industries. Moreover, a state that wishes to encourage the growth 
lm.prove the economic conditions of its local authors and industries may 
no reason why this policy should be extended to foreign nationals. 
ing protection to the latter brings with it the possibility of a measure 
eign domination or control and, perhaps more significantly, an outflow 
h. This may affect a state's self-perception of its autonomy, individual-
d power, as well as its balance of trade and ultimately its general 
omic position in an era of almost systemic economic uncertainty. 
that voluntarily extend protection to foreigners may do so professedly 
se of altruistic reasons, a traditionally strong belief in the notion of 
rs' rights, or an expansive view of their international obligations. In 
instances, one suspects a state makes these gestures more because it 
ives that it has little to lose and everything to gain by them. States 
·ng this policy are typically net exporters of copyright material; by 
g an example, they hope to encourage or be in a position to pressure 
r states to follow suit. Philosophical romanticism may be the avowed 
5 See, e.g., Report of the STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS AND CuLTURE'S SUB-
COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF COPYRIGHT, "A Charter of Rights for Creators" (1985, 
Ministry of Supply and Services Canada), pp. 103-112, passim (Summary of Recommenda-
tions) ("the Charter"). 
As used here, "formal reciprocity" means that state A will protect state B's nationals and 
vice versa; the standard of protection is unstated, but the standard of both the RBC and 
UCC, departed from in only exceptional cases, is national treatment. "Material reciprocity" 
means that state A grants nationals of state B the same protection as state B grants to state 
A's nationals; this principle is disfavoured in copyright treaties because of the costs and 
difficulties in establishing foreign law. 
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reason for the policy but, in reality, material and economic self-in 
the more powerful propellants. 6 
Despite these political realities, the question of what obligations a 
under to extend national treatment by virtue of the RBC or the u 
legal one and will be so considered here.7 The broad issues that 
studied are: 
a) What "works" qualify for national treatment? In particular, do so 
video recordings, published editions, performances, broadcasts, 
puter programs qualify? 
b) What "rights" must be given national treatment? In particular, d 
such as the droit de suite, home taping and public lending rights q 
In examining these questions, we shall find a surprising diversity 
existing on both matters of approach and points of detail. The re 
these differences are no doubt complex. Occasionally, a comment 
almost like a brief for a particular interest group; when one learns 
writer was at one time employed or retained by a sector of the co 
industry, one sometimes wonders whether the possibility of subco 
bias may exist. Sometimes a commentator fails to appreciate the 
scope of the RBC and the UCC in the light of their history and purp 
to apply appropriate principles of interpretation to the treaties. It is 
tedly difficult entirely to eliminate the preconceptions instilled by one 
national culture, history and legislation when viewing other copyright 
tion, even international treaties. 
Other commentators seem to give insufficient weight to the fact that the 
of both the RBC and the UCC, while seeking ostensibly to reconcile co 
6 Thus, the United States is currently placing pressure on a number of countries (p · 
the Caribbean, the Far East and Canada) by threats of economic and trade retar 
attempt to force these states to adopt U .S.-like copyright laws preventing practic 
from counterfeiting to picking up television signals from U.S. satellites. A Pr 
policy statement issued in April 1986 stated: "The United States provides strong 
for intellectual property rights within our borders for domestic and foreign 
businesses. We expect other nations to do the same in the interest of stimulatillg i 
innovation and improving living standards throughout the world." (New York 
April 7, 1986, p. 21). 
7 Both Conventions lay down certain substantive rights that all participating sta 
extend to foreigners. States failing to provide for these rights will obviously be in b 
the Conventions. This comment deals only with rights not specifically required 
granted by the Conventions, which a State chooses to extend to its nationals. 
National Treatment Requirements 581 
tions of European and Anglo-American concepts of authors' rights and 
'ght respectively, have generally reflected the former rather than the 
. European notions, emphasizing the need for authors, artists and com-
to have continuing control over their works, require intellectual 
·ty of the sort commonly associated with those classes of works and 
rs as a precondition to granting protection. The economic rights of the 
(to reap profit from uses made of the work) and his/her moral rights 
ve the work properly credited, not prejudicially modified, and even 
d where it no longer conforms with the author's views) are the twin 
of the European edifice. Anglo-American notions, while recognizing 
'tial importance of the creative classes, are willing to extend protection 
works lacking intellectual creativity so long as they involve an invest-
of time, labour or money. Economic rights are emphasized; author's 
rights, on the other hand, are generally little regarded. Where they are 
ized, moral rights are rarely protected as such; more often, a patch-
of common law or statutory doctrines of unfair competition, passing off 
amation have to be resorted to. In short, European theory emphasizes 
author, the importance of his/her contribution to culture, and conse-
tly his/her need for both economic and moral rights; Anglo-American 
ry stresses the entrepreneur, the importance of his/her role in bringing 
s to public attention, and consequently the purely economic nature of 
'ght. 
ms fair to say that the states espousing the European view present at 
RBC and UCC Conferences succeeded, through a combination of force 
umbers and persuasion, in ensuring that authors' rights notions tended to 
ail over copyright concepts in case of conflict. The texts of both the RBC 
the UCC reflect this success, a fact that must constantly be kept in mind 
n the texts are being interpreted. 
shall proceed, first, by briefly setting out the relevant principles of treaty 
rpretation to be followed. Secondly, we shall analyze in some detail the 
evant language in the RBC (Paris 1971) and its prior texts down to Rome 
28.8 Thirdly, we shall make a similar analysis of the UCC. 
8 Thailand is the only country adhering to a prior text (Berlin 1908). The remarks to be made 
about the Rome 1928 text apply equally to the Berlin 1908 text, which is similar in all 
aspects relevant to this study. 
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B. Principles of Interpretation 
"To proclaim in 1984 that the law of statutory interpretation is a m 
contradictory rules, presumptions, and practices which litigants and 
can draw on to defend opposite conclusions is merely to repeat the co 
place learning of the day."9 
What was said to be true in 1984 of domestic principles of statutory int 
tation has been thought by some to be just as true of principles of 
interpretation.10 As the plethora of dissenting and majority judicial op' 
amply attests, the search for some "objective" meaning in a treaty is a 
fraught with difficulty. Some have thought that the most that can be do 
to "apply considerations of reasonableness and good faith or, in otherw 
the jus aequum rule", which is "necessarily the outcome of a balancing 
cess between conflicting equities."11 
The corning into force in 1980 of the Vienna Convention on the La 
Treaties 1969 has sought to bring some semblance of order into treaty · 
pretation. The Vienna Convention has not been ratified by some coun 
but international tribunals and organizations have approved and applie 
principles of interpretation appearing in Arts. 31 and 32, even when de 
with pre-Convention treaties, as reflecting either a codification of cust 
international law or, more plausibly, the current development of appro 
principles of international law. The principles stated in Arts. 31 and 
"the comparatively few general principles which appear to constituteg 
rules for the interpretation of treaties. "12 They are not intended to dis 
other principles and maxims in international practice that "are, for the 
part, principles of logic and good sense valuable only as guides to 
appreciating the meaning which the parties may have intended to atta 
the expressions that they employed in a document."13 
The relevant principles for interpreting the RBC and UCC seem to be 
following. Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention requires a treaty to 
9 TuCKER, "The Gospel of Statutory Rules requiring Liberal Interpretation according t 
Peter's" 35 Uni.Tor. L.J. 113 (1985). 
10 See, e.g., STONE, "Fictional elements in treaty interpretation - A Study in the Interhati . 
Judicial Process" 1 Syd. L.Rev. 344 (1955). 
11 SCHWARZENBERGER, "A Manual of International Law" (5th ed., 1967), 164. 
12 WETZEL & RAuscHNING (eds.), "The Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties:.Tra 
Preparatoires" (1978, Metzner, Frankfurt), pp. 250-251 (Official Commentary on Arts:; 
and 32). 
13 Id., at 250. 
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reted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
e. Thus, the starting point must be the text of the Conventions in their 
.14 The preamble to the Conventions and subsequent state practice 
lishing an understanding of the parties regarding the interpretation of 
onventions are relevant. Where the parties intended terms to have a 
almeaning, that meaning will be applied. 15 
r Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, "supplementary means of inter-
tion, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances 
conclusion" may be regarded to confirm meaning, or to determine it 
e the interpretation according to Art. 31 leaves the meaning "ambiguous 
scure" or "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable". 
differing views have been expressed concerning the clauses of the RBC 
UCC to be considered, their meaning must be considered sufficiently 
iguous for travaux preparatoires to be used as aids to construction. 16 In 
event, Art. 32 does not prevent all relevant material being used to assist 
process of interpretation. It simply stresses that supplementary means of 
retation are not "an alternative, autonomous method of interpretation 
reed from the general rule". In practice, the circumstances in which a 
ty has been concluded and the travaux preparatoires are regularly assess-
d relied on by international tribunals.17 We shall find these matters of 
e use in throwing light on the language used in the RBC and UCC. 
matters regarding the "ordinary meaning" to be given to the Conven-
s should be mentioned at this point. First, that meaning cannot be consid-
in grammatical isolation but only in the context of the whole treaty .18 
preambles to the Conventions indicate that a construction favouring the 
SINCLAIR, "The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties" (2nd ed., 1984, Manchester 
Univ. Press), pp. 117-119. Literalism should bow to an interpretation that effects the 
treaty's purpose: Re Regina & Palacios 7 D.L.R. (4th) 112, at 120-121 (Ontario C.A., 
1984). 
Vienna Convention, Art. 31.3(b), 31.4. 
Domestic British practice now permits this if the travaux are accessible to the public and if 
they clearly point to a definite legislative intention: Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd 
[1981] A.C. 251, at 278 (H.L.). 
7 SINCLAIR, supra note 14, at 116, 141 et seq. See SCHONHERR, "On the Interpretation of 
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, Taking as an Example the Greek Antipiracy Law of 
July 15, 1980", Copyright (1981), 294 at 295. 
18 Id., at 121. 
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author's protection may generally be preferred, 19 but the context mayr 
apparently sweeping language to be read restrictively. 20 
Secondly, the RBC provisions to be examined can be traced back t 
original BC of 1886 and also influenced the drafting of the UCC. The 
nary meaning of the Conventions and their revisions should be ascertai 
reference to linguistic usage current at the time of their conclusio 
proposition is one "both of common sense and good faith" and "im 
the rule that meaning of terms is to be determined by reference to the 
of the treaty and to its objects and purposes". 21 On the one hand, obli 
that the parties never contemplated at the time of concluding the C 
tions cannot be imposed on them under the guise of interpretation. 
other hand, the Conventions when concluded were intended to regul 
parties' behaviour for the indefinite future. Accordingly, when the 
dealt with matters that were known to fluctuate with time and 
which were subject to rapid technological development, they may ha 
erately used open-textured language to encompass new developments. 
C. Berne Convention 
1. Paris 1971 Text: General Principles 
Article 5(1) and (2) of RBC (Paris 1971)22 states: 
(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected 
this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of ori · 
rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant· to 
nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention. 
19 Gribble v. Man. Free Press Co. Ltd [1931] 3 W.W.R. 570, at 571 (Manitoba C.A.). 
20 MacDonald v. Vapor Can. Ltd [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, at 176-177 (Can.), inte 
Art. lObi' of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (London 
text). 
21 WETZEL & RAUSCHNING, supra note 12, at 244 (observations of the Special Rapp 
Humphrey Waldock, on Arts. 31and32 of the Vienna Convention); SCHWA 
supra note 11 ("treaty interpretation aims at the establishment of the true mea 
treaty at the time when it was concluded"); A"ow River & Tributaries Slide & Bo 
Ltd v. Pigeon Timber Co. Ltd [1932] S.C.R. 495, at 508 (Can.); Black-Clawsonlnt'l 
Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenberg A.G. [1975] A.C. 591, at 643-644 (H.L.). 
22 The RBC (Stockholm 1967) and the RBC (Paris 1971) texts are identical for all p 
relevant to this study. Thus, unless otherwise mentioned, the comments on the 197f 
apply equally to the 1967 text. 
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The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any 
ality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the exist-
of protection in the country of origin of the work. Consequently, apart 
the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the 
s of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed 
lusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed. 
585 
reference in Article 5(1) to "works for which [authors] are protected 
this Convention" refers naturally back to Art. 2(6): "The works men-
. in this Article shall enjoy protection in all countries of the Union." 
RBC therefore covers only works that Art. 2 protects; works outside 
Article fall outside the RBC. 
works mentioned are primarily "literary and artistic works". 23 Related 
've works that, on a purist view, might not fall naturally under that 
or that might be subject to prior authors' rights (henceforth called 
ted works") are also specifically mentioned in Art. 2. They co11Jfrise 
ative works such as translations, adaptations, and arrangements; col-
e works such as encyclopaedias and anthologies;25 optionally, official 
of a legislative, administrative and legal nature;26 optionally, works of 
lied art and industrial designs and models, but if the last two categories 
not given special protection (e.g., under industrial designs legislation), 
are protected as artistic works. 27 
from a special problem of interpretation to be dealt with in a moment 
from the RBC Brussels 1948 text and previous texts, the obligations 
don a RBC member as a result of these provisions may be summarized 
A state must grant foreign RBC "authors" for their protected "works" 
those "rights" which a state grants now or in the future to its own na-
tionals. 
A foreign author seeking protection in the state for his/her work will 
have his/her rights determined according to the state's law, whatever 
Art. 2(1) defines these as including "every production in the literary, scientific and artistic 
domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression", and then goes on to provide 
a non-exhaustive list of examples. These examples, many of which were present in the first 
BC in 1886, have been progressively revised and expanded in subsequent revisions. 
Art. 2(3). 
Art. 2(5). 
Art. 2(4). 
Art. 2(7). 
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protection his/her work enjoys in its country of origin.28 This pro 
and the previous one elaborate the principle of assimilation that 
the hallmark of the BC from its inception in 1886: foreign wo 
assimilated to local works. Courts enforcing copyrights will apply 
Jori, not some other law that might otherwise be mandated b 
domestic court's principles of conflicts of law.29 
( c) The state must provide those "rights specially granted by this Co 
tion" to foreign authors. Apart from the provisions imposing m· 
standards of protection that all states must extend, the precise 
the works protected and the rights granted are by and large 1 
state's legislative discretion. The works included within the RBC 
rights attaching to them, which a state is obliged to protect, have 
progressively enlarged since the original BC. Theoretically, the 
not supposed to compromise a state's internal affairs, since itd 
oblige the state to extend protection for such works to its nation 
the framers of the RBC well understood, however, in practice the 
does oblige a state to extend protection to such works, since it is u 
able that foreign authors should obtain a larger protection in a sfate 
do the state's own nationals.30 
2. Brussels 1948 and Previous Texts 
The position just outlined applies generally to all versions of the RBC 
to the 1971 Paris text. There is however a problem relating to a chan 
language in Art. 5(1) of RBC (Paris 1971) from prior texts. That 
specifies that the "works" subject to national treatment are those "for 
[authors] are protected under this Convention". This last phrase is 
from the corresponding provision, Art. 4(1), of the Brussels 1948 and.R 
1928 texts. The latter Article simply says that RBC authors shalle 
national treatment "for their works". Has the Paris text simply made e 
what was implicit in the Brussels and prior texts or, as has sometimes 
claimed,31 do the latter texts grant protection for a wider range of sub 
28 Art. 5(2) states in explicit terms what was implicit in prior texts of the RBC. 
29 DESBOIS, "Le Droit d'Auteur en France" (2nd ed., 1966), para. 805. As to the case 
state A is asked to enforce a copyright infringement occurring in state B, see 
"Intellectual Property Rights and the Conflict of Laws" (Kluwer, 1978), at pp. 9 et 
30 BRIGGS, "The Law of International Copyright" (London, 1906), at 293-294; RAEST 
Convention de Berne revisee a Rome 1928" (Paris, 1931), at 43. Similarly, as to the U 
RINGER & FLACK, "Applicability of the Universal Copyright Convention to Certain W 
in the Public Domain in their Country of Origin" 27 Bull. Copr. Soc. 157, at 163 (1 
31 E.g., DAWID, "Basic Principles of International Copyright" 21 Bull. Copr. Soc. 1, at, 
(1973), both for the RBC and UCC. · · 
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er, namely any "works" whether or not they appear in the definition 
'sions of Art. 2? 
rnore plausible view is the former, namely that "works" means "works 
cted by the Convention". In other words, the RBC Paris text has said 
itly what was always implicit under prior RBC texts. This is supported 
number of considerations. 
inor point is that no chan~e in wording of Brussels Art. 4(1) was initially 
osed at Stockholm 1967. 2 The change seems to have occurred at some 
stage of the proceedings and does not appear to have been debated to 
degree. This suggests that the alteration was merely stylistic or clarifica-
and not a matter of substance. However, too much cannot be made of 
argument since the principle of interpretation, that it is frequently 
gerous to construe an earlier statute by reference to the wording of a later 
seems just as valid in the international sphere as it is in the domestic. 
parties' intention as revealed by texts concluded in 1928 and 1948 can 
y be revealed by later texts that, by definition, were not then contem-
d. Nevertheless, since the history of the RBC has been one of pro-
. ely increasing the degree of protection with each revision, it would be 
'sing if texts prior to Stockholm afforded wider protection than the 
e major argument in favour of the proposition that "work" is unqualified 
Ives a literal interpretation of the text. The word has no preceding adjec-
s; if "literary and artistic work" and related works were meant, why did 
the drafters say so? Their silence on this point must be deliberate; they 
nded any "work", whether or not it fell within the category of works the 
C required to be protected. 
· argument however proves too much. The context requires the word 
rk" to be limited in some way; otherwise, a roast beef meal made by an 
r would arguably be internationally protected, since it is a "work". The 
se might be to say that the immediate context of Art. 4(1) imposes the 
tation that the "work" must be one produced by an "author" qua author, 
tis, exercising the faculties of an "author"; or that "work" itself implies 
e intellectual creativity. This would therefore exclude the roast beef meal 
still include works that did not necessarily fall within the definition of 
erary and artistic" or related works. 
32 WIPO, "Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11 to July 14, 
1967" (1971, Geneva), vol. 1, at p. 91; vol. 2, at 1136. 
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However, the words must be read not merely in their immediate conte 
in the context of the RBC as a whole. Once this occurs, we find apla 
alternative explanation why the phrase "literary and artistic works" was 
ted in Art. 4(1), especially if RBC (Rome 1928) is considered. Rome 
cle 3 requires photographs to be protected but does not categorize 
either literary or artistic works, because BC members before and at 
disagreed upon whether they could properly be classed as "artistic wo 
all. Furthermore, by Rome Art. 14 cinematographic works were assi · 
to photographs, rather than literary and artistic works, if "the autho 
[not) given the work an original character". Thus, had Rome Art. 4(1) 
red to "literary and artistic works", related works such as photograph 
some cinematographs would have been excluded from national treat 
The unqualified word "work" thus ensured that both literary and 
works and those related works that did not fall within this phrase but 
RBC Rome nevertheless required to be protected were in fact pr 
under Art. 4(1). When photographs and cinematographs were no 
treated as related works and were shifted into the definition of literary 
artistic works at Brussels in 1948, the reason for using the unqualified 
"work" in Art. 4(1) ceased but no-one apparently thought, quite 1 
mately, that a consequential change in drafting was required to make ex 
what was implicit, namely, that "works" referred to all "works mentione 
this Article [2)" that now "enjoy[ ed] protection in all countries of 
Union".33 
Moreover, the principle that sweeping words must be read in contexf4 
ports the narrower interpretation. The RBC's preamble makes it clear 
the RBC is not concerned with protecting "works", but "literary and 
works". Rome Article 4(1) follows Arts. 2 and 3,35 which have just de 
the works which states are bound to protect. One would thus expect that 
work" and "works" of authors to which Art. 4(1) now refers relates nat 
back to the works just mentioned. 
It should also be noted that the word "work" appears in an unqualified fo 
in a number of other provisions in RBC (Brussels 1948) and correspon 
33 RBC (Brussels 1948), Art. 2(4). The argument based on the layout of the text of 
(Rome 1928) is reinforced by the layout of the original BC 1886. Article 2, correspon · 
RBC Rome Art. 4, was followed by Art. 4 defining literary and artistic works, and then 
Art. 6 which protected translations merely as "original works" without classifying them 
literary or artistic. 
34 See supra note 20. 
35 Art. 3 of Rome was omitted in Brussels 1948 consequent on the decision to move 
subject-matter of photographs appearing in that Article into the definition of "literary 
artistic works" in Art. 2(1). 
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us texts, as well as RBC (Paris 1971). These include provisions entitl-
state to retaliate against non-RBC states whose nationals publish in an 
state but who do not adequately protect an RBC national (RBC 1948 
6(2)), as well as provisions prescribing minimum ri~hts such as moral 
(Art. 6b15), the term of protection (Arts. 7 and 7 15), the seizure of 
· g works (Art. 16), and the period of commencement of the RBC 
8). Nothing in these provisions suggests that any wider meaning than 
, artistic and related works as defined in the RBC is meant. The 
ic principle of interpretation that the same word should prima facie 
e same meaning wherever it appears in a text should prevail here 
y, reinforcing the view suggested above for Art. 4(1). This conclusion 
weakened because the RBC sometimes uses the phrase "literary and 
works" in full. This occurs especially when a contrast is sought with 
· ns applicable to particular works in that category, (e.g., dramatic and 
lworks (Art. 11), literary works (Art. 11ter), musical works (Art.13)). 
total consistency has not been attained is in any event not unusual in a 
that has evolved over a long period of time and been subject to succes-
drafts and revisions. 
history, object and purpose of the RBC support this narrower interpre-
nof Art. 4(1). The first BC was concluded just three years after the Paris 
for the International Protection of Industrial Property had been estab-
in 1883. Many states were then and are now members of both Unions. 
Conventions were considered to be dealing with different subject-mat-
distinction sought to be maintained throughout later revisions of both. 
ally, a "work" in the BC could refer to matters that fell properly under 
eading of "industrial property". Since the obligations imposed on Paris 
members are different, given the subject-matter, from those on BC 
, they obviously sought to avoid or minimize the possibility that a 
rk" might fall under both Conventions. 36 The protection of authors' 
was and still is considered distinguishable both phenomenologically 
sociologically from other areas of law. As Dietz has pointed out, a 
omenological definition is necessary to hive copyright off vertically from 
ate legal areas such as industrial property (patents, trade marks and, 
aps, designs); the former is concerned with creativity, the latter more 
knowledge and protecting investment. Sociologically, copyright can be 
moted on the rationale of protecting writers, musicians and artists in 
The possibility that works of applied art could fall under either Convention caused difficul-
ties at most revision Conferences, leading to compromises such as that reflected in RBC 
(Paris 1971), Art. 2(7): see generally, REICHMAN, "Design Protection in Domestic and 
Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976" 
(1983] Duke L.J. 1143, at 1153 et seq. 
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relation to their work.37 This basis is implausible for industrial pro 
indeed, the different classes of industrial property may each required· 
rationales for their justification. 
One may test the thesis another way. Suppose that, during any of the 
Conferences up to and including Brussels, a participant had moved that 
phrase "even though the works are not literary or artistic (or, at 
photographs or cinematographs) as defined in this Convention" be in 
after "works" in Art. 4(1): would other members have reacted by 
"Oh no, that is unnecessary; it already means that"? This seems u 
given the travail at the 1908 RBC over what works should be spec· 
literary or artistic under Art. 2, a debate that continued in Rome 1928 
Brussels 1948. A more likely response to the hypothetical question w 
have been: "No, this is a Conference about literary and artistic works, 
about other sorts of works. For other works, we already have the 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which is periodi 
revised. If we want to protect still other things internationally, thatis s 
thing for further discussion." 
It may therefore be concluded that a proper interpretation of "works", 
appears in RBC (Brussels) Art. 4(1) and the corresponding langu 
previous texts, would limit that term to "literary and artistic works" and 
related works that by Art. 2 are required to be protected throughout 
Union. In this respect, the position is identical to that now existing u 
RBC (Paris 1971) Art. 5(1). 
3. What Works Fall under the RBC? 
Suppose a state chooses to grant copyright protection to an object it c 
literary, artistic or related work: does that work fall under the national 
ment requirement of RBC Art. 5(1) or its prior equivalents? In other wo 
do the definitions of the RBC have their own Convention meaning or m 
state define them broadly or narrowly according to its own law?. 
Older and more modern authorities have taken opposing views on this q 
tion. Thus, a Swiss court in 1936 held sound recordings, which were by 
law equated with adaptations (a protected category of related works 
RBC (Berlin 1908)), should be given national treatment under the 
37 DIETZ, "Copyright Law in the European Community" (1978, Sijthoff & Noordhoff), at 
seq. Accord: BRIGGS, supra note 30, at 274-275. 
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adaptations in the RBC sense did not include records was apparently 
ght irrelevant. 38 Similarly, Ricketson has recently claimed that 
re is no reason why such things as sound recordings and broadcasts could 
be considered "literary and artistic works" under art. 2(1) because they are 
as much "intellectual creations" and "productions in the literary, scientific 
artistic domain" as are cineroatograph films which are also expressly refer-
to as "original works" under art. 14bis(l). The protection of these further 
es of work however is left to each country to do at its discretion. "39 (emphasis 
ed) 
contrary view has been taken by Ostertag40 and Ulmer, the latter saying: 
general rule [is] that the concept of those works for which national 
ent is demanded, is defined by the Convention". 41 A state that defines 
more broadly than required under the RBC is neither obliged nor 
d by the RBC to extend national treatment for those works, nor is it 
ed or entitled to claim national treatment for them in another RBC 
LADAS, supra note 3, at 266 reaches the same conclusion, relying partly on the Swiss 
decision. The decision is referred to and criticized in OSTERTAG, "La protection des disques 
etrangers en Suisse", Le Droit d'Auteur (1940) 41. Ladas's work appeared before Oster-
tag's article and does not assess the latter's argument. 
RICKETSON, "The Law of Intellectual Property" (1984, Law Book Co., Sydney), para. 
14.22. The "WIPO Guide", supra note 3, at 13, in saying that "[t]he expression 'literary and 
artistic works' must be taken as including all works capable of being protected" may support 
Ricketson: but see criticism of similar language at text infra accompanying note 147 et seq. 
At first sight, STEWART seems to hold the same view: "International Copyright and Neigh-
bouring Rights" (1983, Butterworths), para. 5.30 (henceforth STEWART I). After pointing 
out that one reason why the list of works under Art. 2(1) is non-exhaustive is so that new 
objects should fall under the general definition as technology progresses, he adds that a 
second reason "is that in many countries the list of works includes things like recordings or 
broadcasts, which are not works in other countries". The implication is that such countries 
would be bound to grant national treatment to such works once they are included within 
their list of literary and artistic works. However, an earlier piece suggests that Stewart may 
not have intended this implication: STEWART, "Recent Developments and Future Prospects 
on the International Level in the Field of Phonograms and Videocassettes", in WIPO, 
"Current Trends in the Field of Intellectual Property" (Montreux 1971 Conference) 266, at 
271 (henceforth "Stewart II"). 
0 Supra note 38, at 42-43. 
41 ULMER, "The 'Droit de Suite' in International Copyright Law" 6 IIC 12, at 21 (1975), 
agreeing with OSTERTAG, supra note 38; BRIGGS, supra note 30, at 335. STEUP, "The Rule 
of National Treatment for Foreigners and its Application to new Benefits for Authors" 25 
Bull. Cop. Soc. 279, at 281-282 (1977) so concludes when considering the question of 
"rights" under RBC Art. 5(1) and UCC Art. I; her conclusion applies equally to "works". 
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The view held by Ostertag and Ulmer seems preferable. It is true, as 
son says, that the word "work" is nowhere defined in the RBC, 
wrong simply to focus on this word. The RBC is not a treaty pr 
"works". As its preamble states and as is stressed throughout virt 
Article including Art. 5(1), it is one protecting the rights of authors 0 
literary and artistic works. Like "work", "author" is not defined in 
but, as we shall see, it has always had a well-recognized meaning. 
tion of work is necessarily limited by the fact that only authors' 
artistic and related works are protected. 
We can now turn to elaborate these concepts and consider how they a 
various sorts of disputed works. 
I 
Since "author" is not defined in the RBC, Stewart has argued that "the 
the state where protection is claimed decides who is an 'author'." He 
tinues: 
The reason for this lack of definition is that the national laws of member sta 
differ greatly on this point. French law and many systems derived from 
law or influenced by it recognise only physical persons as authors (w 
composers, painters, sculptors etc.). Anglo-Saxon legislations and others 
enced by them recognise legal entities, e.g. film producers, record produce 
broadcasting organisations as authors or original right owners.42 
There is however more to the question of "authorship", as Stewart 
later recognizes. 43 First, a state cannot be entirely free to decide wh 
author. For one thing, the RBC deals with people, not animals: no st 
claim that a monkey that daubs is the "author" of a painting. Se 
authorship implies some relevant causal link between a work and a p 
involved in it: a state cannot claim to be the author of any work its n.ati 
produce, simply because its nationals are its subjects. Logically, the 
the meaning of the term "author" must be derived from and regulated 
RBC, not by the meaning an individual state chooses to place on the 
nothing in the RBC suggests otherwise. A state may have some libe 
action in deciding who or what constitutes an "author", but cannot co 
another RBC state to accept its idiosyncratic meaning to the extent th 
departs from the international law significance of the term in the RBC. 
42 STEWART I, supra note 39, at p. 101. Similarly, "WIPO Guide", supra note 3, at p. 
43 Id., para. 7.04 et seq., dealing with neighbouring rights. 
44 Accord: ULMER, supra note 41; OSTERTAG, supra note 38. 
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the BC's inception, "author" has meant a natural person, not a juristic 
11 such as a corporation. Only natural persons, not corporations, can 
a nationality and can create works; only natural persons can exercise 
rights over their works. 45 These doctrinal difficulties caused vigorous 
ions at a number of RBC conferences about whether a photograph 
be "authored", or who could properly be called the "author" of a 
atograph film, the various creative people who contributed to the final 
ct or the producer who organized the enterprise. 46 
rship and ownership of rights in a work must be distinguished. Nor-
authorship implies ownership of rights in the work. This theory must 
er accommodated with the case of pseudonymous, anonymous or 
wn authors, where a practical need exists for someone, typically the 
s publisher, to vindicate rights on the author's behalf. The RBC ex-
permits this. 47 More difficult problems arise where an entity employs 
ommissions an author: states often allocate ownership to the employer, 
g legal techniques varying from vesting the copyright initially in the 
Ioyer to creating an automatic assignment of rights from the author to 
MANN, "International Corporations and National Law" 42 B.Y.I.L. 145, at 151 (1967); 
DAV<1D, supra note 31, at 8. The purity of this position was reinforced when a British 
proposal at RBC Brussels to define "author" as including "assignee or other rights owner" 
was rejected in favour of a proposal to extend Convention rights to an author "and his 
successors in title" (RBC 1948, Art. 2(4)); UNION INTERNATIONALE POUR LA PROTECTION 
DES OEUVRES LITTERAIRES ET ARTISTIQUES, "Documents de la Conference Reunie a 
Bruxelles du 5 au 26 juin 1948" (Berne, 1951), at 164-165 (henceforth "Documents"). On 
the position under RBC (Rome 1928), see RAESTAD, supra note 30, at 173-174; LADAS, 
supra note 3, para. 91. 
It was not until RBC Stockholm 1967 that a compromise was reached on the latter issue. 
This distinguished between the creative people who were termed "authors" and the pro-
ducer of the film who was considered a "maker": see, e.g., RBC (Paris 1971), Art. 4(a); 
5(c)(i); 14(1); 15(2). For the debate, see WrPo, supra note 32, vol. 2, at 887 et seq., 931 et 
seq. The matter was extensively discussed by ULMER, "Opinion on Cinematography and 
copyright given at the request of the Office of the International Union for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works" (Berne, 1953) at pp. 4 et seq. 
47 RBC (Paris 1971) allows (1) a named publisher prima facie to be "deemed to represent" the 
pseudonymous or anonymous author (Art. 15(3), a provision traceable to BC 1886, Art. 11 
and later texts); (2) a competent state authority to represent the "unknown author", e.g., in 
the case of folklore (Art. 15(4)(a)). These are evidentiary presumptions and do not affect 
the true incidence of authorship or ownership: "WIPO Guide", supra note 3, at pp. 93-95; 
Hogg v. Toye & Co. [1935] Ch. 497 (C.A.); Circle Film Enterprises Inc. v. C.B.C. 20 
D.L.R.(2d) 211 (Can.S.C., 1959). 
-
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the employer. 48 Pressures from industry and reasons of expediency oc 
ally have caused states to go further and fictionally to define the a 
employer, normally a corporation, not merely as owner of the copy· 
also as author of the work.49 Although functionally equivalent to theo 
automatic assignment or initial vesting of copyright in the employ 
latter technique seems inconsistent with RBC's basic principles and 
especially if heed is not paid to the author's moral rights. 
"Author" in the RBC implies a person who applies his/her personal er 
to produce a literary or artistic work. As will be shown below, perfo 
sound recorders, broadcasters and the like are neither "authors" nor d 
create "literary and artistic works". Performers, however creative, o 
sent a performance of a work; broadcasters do no better. Sound recor 
best record the performance of a work, or at worst record an event in 
In either case, their work, however skilled, is essentially mechanical 
than creative. 50 
48 PLAISANT, "The Employee-Author and Literary and Artistic Property'', Copyright 
274; COHEN JEHORAM, "The Author's Place in Society and Legal Relations 
Authors and those Responsible for Distributing their Works", Copyright (1978) 
391-393; Cuv!LLIER, "Employment and Copyright'', Copyright (1979) 112. See ge 
ULMER, supra note 29, at pp. 36-39. To speak of the employer as having '' 
authorship" (cf LIMPERG, "Employees' Rights in their Capacity of Author", C 
(1980), 293, at 294) merely confuses authorship with ownership. 
49 See authorities in previous note. This has led to the assertion that the U.S. "work for 
doctrine, under which the hirer is considered the author, is compatible with the 
"Preliminary Report", supra note 1, ch. 14, p. 4 et seq.; sed quaere: see LIMPERG,pr 
note, at 298-299. 
50 See text infra, accompanying notes 61 et seq. The doctrinal arguments are of course 
drawn. Performers and sound and film technicians are often as creative in their me 
authors. Doctrinal fundamentalism expresses a different reality. The political and e 
reasons why individual authors need rights over their works differ from those that or 
tions, typically the entities producing movies, broadcasts and records, can proffer for 
tection. Modigliani and Van Gogh present more pressing cases for kindly solicitude 
does the British Broadcasting Corporation or Twentieth Century Fox. Composers 
feared that the grant of author's status to performers would result in the formers' · 
being diminished: a pie can only be divided a finite number of times. These trut 
conveniently be obscured so long as resort to high principle is successful. See 
BODENHAUSEN, "Protection of 'Neighboring Rights'" 19 Law & Contemp. 
(1954); WIPO, "Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms Con 
(1981), pp. 7-18; MILLE, "Performers' Rights: A New Independent Institution of 
tual Property Law", Copyright (1984), 289. 
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II 
rd "work" is undefined, so it has been said that "the law of the state 
e protection is claimed decides what is a 'work'. "51 This is true to some 
t; a state can require fixation or some degree of intellectual creation 
e an object can qualify as a "work" .52 But the same reasons that dictate 
rship" to be a term bounded by the RBC apply equally to "work". 
point is not of central significance since, as has been argued above, 
k" in RBC (Paris 1971) Art. 5(1) and its predecessors means those 
ary and artistic works" and related works mentioned in the RBC as 
·g protection. The question now is: what works come under this um-
? 
III 
{Paris) Article 2(1) gives a non-exhaustive list of "literary and artistic 
" that members are bound to protect. 53 The list is deliberately open-
d to include new technologies, but it does not follow that anything a 
chooses to classify as a "literary" or "artistic" work falls under the RBC. 
r's.comment that states "are entirely free to interpret at their discre-
the term "literary and artistic work"54 cannot be accepted literally. A 
cannot include in the term something that does not belong there, any 
.than it can exclude something that obviously does. The language of 
2(1) is broad but bounded. · 
RBC itself recognizes this. In the Rome 1928 and previous texts, photo-
hs and works produced by a process analogous to photography were 
with separately from literary and artistic works, obviously because they 
not otherwise fall within the definition; similarly, special protection 
made for cinematograph productions. True, at Brussels 1948 photo-
hs and cinematographs were added to the non-exhaustive list of exam-
of "literary and artistic works"; this simply signifies that, in light of the 
ution of those media and an overwhelming international consensus, 
BC members finally suppressed their objections or sufficiently over-
STEWART I, supra note 38, para. 5.30. 
Id.; see also "WIPO Guide'', supra note 3, at 17. The requirement of intellectual creativity 
may flow equally from the concept of authorship, or may be inherent in the adjectives that 
qualify "work", i.e., "literary" or "artistic": see "Documents", supra note 45, at 94 ("Rap-
port general"), 154-155. See also DAWID, supra note 31, at 7. 
Art. 2(6). Corresponding provisions appear in prior versions of the RBC. 
4 KLAVER, "The Legal Problems of Video-Cassettes and Audio-Visual Discs" 23 Bull. Cop. 
Soc. 152, at 159 (1976). 
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came their doctrinal difficulties to recognize the creative, rather than 
mechanical, character of much of those works. 55 It does not suggest t 
meaning of "literary and artistic work" has somehow consequ 
changed. If one amends a definition section that says "dogsinclude 
mice" by adding "sheep" to the list, this provides no warrant for argu· 
cattle or any other quadruped is also included because, though not a d 
shares many of the characteristics of the examples. 
Thus, a state may choose to call a tree planted by a gardener an "ar 
work under its copyright law, but it does not follow that this qualifies 
"artistic" or any other form of "work" under Art. 2(1); nor that the gar 
is an "author" in terms of Art. 5(1), a term that connotes intellectual 
ity of a particular kind; nor, accordingly, that the state is bound to 
national treatment under Art. 5(1). If a state chooses to include wit · 
definition of "work of architecture" a work of landscape architecture,50 
work would not be subject to national treatment under Art. 5(1) 
landscape architecture fell within either the general concept of a "literary 
artistic work" or the specific example of a "work of architecture" in a 
with the meaning of those words in the RBC. A state might, for its 
reasons, voluntarily extend national treatment, but this is another ma 
The language of the RBC must have a shared common core of meaning 
every member would in good faith recognize as placing an obligation o 
Material falling outside that shared common core cannot be part of the 
obligations. Formal reciprocity is the logic of the RBC: a state pr 
foreign works precisely because it expects that same class of works 
nationals to be protected by other RBC states. It cannot reasonably e 
works outside the ambit of the RBC to be ~ranted foreign protection:tha 
outside the quid pro quo of the compact.5 
55 Germany, one of the states traditionally favouring total exclusion of cinematographs 
photographs from the category of literary and artistic works, did not press this poin 
Brussels 1948, since it had merely observer status and was represented by a member of 
British delegation: "Documents", supra note 45, at pp. 54n., 60; the latter did not 
German doctrinal concerns on this score. States nonetheless remain free to exclude 
protection cinematographs and photographs that lack the personal or intellectual creati 
inherent in the concept of an "artistic work": Id., at 140, 155-156; 94 ("Rapport gene 
56 See, e.g., the expanded definition of "architectural work" under the Copyright Act 
(U.K.), which was held to include such a work: Vincent v. Universal Housing Co. 
[1928-1935] Macg. Cop. Cas. 275, at 279 (Ch., 1931). 
57 OSTERTAG, supra note 38, at 42; Cuisenaire v. South West Imports Ltd [1968] 2 Ex. C 
493, at 511 (aff'd without reference to this point [1969] S.C.R. 208) on the definiti 
in the Canadian Copyright Act 1921, as amended to implement RBC (Rome 1928 
2(1): "it is still necessary to find that the work in which copyright is claimed is an 'o 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work' in the normal meaning of those words and in 
light of the definitions in section 2 of the Act." Cf. LADAS, supra note 3, at 213. 
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IV 
is of course a difficulty with a dynamic definition of "literary and 
·c work" designed to encompass new developments as they arise: how 
one know when and if a new type of work falls under Art. 2(1)? 
uter software, to be discussed below, is a case in point. Software has 
around for some years, yet it is unclear whether, on the present assump-
at it is a literary work under the RBC, the laws of some states protect it 
. The jurisprudence may be unsettled or a final decision of the state's 
t court may be lacking. States may be reluctant to amend their copy-
Iaw to include software until their tribunals have spoken and until the 
·ce of other states has crystallized. If a state's jurisprudence finally holds 
e to be outside the copyright law, will the state have broken its RBC 
tions from the time the new work appeared, since ex hypothesi it was 
otected from that moment? 
RBC does not address this issue. It would however be absurd and 
onable, and thus contrary to the object of the RBC, if a state were 
d as breaking its obligation to protect a new class of literary or artistic 
from the moment that new class arose. In practice there is always a 
d of uncertainty as the various participants in a state's legal system -
ers, courts, bureaucrats, interested parties, and the public - become 
e of and start wrestling with the problem. The period may be long or 
, depending on a country's state of development and the accidents of 
tion. Legal and judicial opinions may initially conflict and some time 
elapse before a final solution is reached. 
the work is eventually held to fall outside the state's copyright law, the 
should have some time to reach a good faith conclusion on whether its 
unal's decision is correct in terms of the RBC. If it concludes the decision 
correct, it should be permitted a further reasonable time, measured by 
exigencies of its political system, to try in good faith to rectify the position 
amending its law. Only if a state acts in bad faith or delays beyond a 
sonable time in aligning its law with the RBC, should it then be held to 
e broken its international obligations. 
viously this view contains some uncertainties, but the only alternatives -
lding a state to be in breach immediately a new class of work arises or 
posing a fixed time schedule for it to embrace the new class within its 
pyright law - are unacceptable as a matter of treaty interpretation or, for 
at matter, good sense. The suggested view has the virtues of according with 
e way in which states actually behave, and of fairly balancing state auton-
y with the problems inherent in administering a dynamic international 
bligation. 
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v 
We are now in a position to examine a number of works to determine ho 
they fall under the RBC. 
(a) Sound Recordings and Broadcasts 
It has been suggested that sound recordings and broadcasts can qu 
"literary and artistic works" under RBC (Paris 1971) Art. 2(1).58 This 
incorrect at least for records. Many RBC states are also members 
Rome International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Pro 
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations 1961. Article 16(a)(iv 
this Convention allows a state to opt out of the national treatment r;eq 
ment for sound recordings and instead apply a rule of material recip 
This would be inconsistent with the RBC requirement of national trea 
if records were works protected under the RBC. Since Article 1 of th 
Convention states that its provisions should not be interpreted as preju 
protection under the RBC, it follows that records could not in 1961 
been considered protected under the RBC (Brussels 1948), nor can they 
so considered under RBC (Paris 1971). 
More general matters support the view that not only sound recordings 
also broadcasts are outside the RBC. Photographs, cinematographs 
analogous works historically were excluded from the definition of "lit 
and artistic works" right up to RBC Rome 1928. Records and broad 
could have fared no better. It was easier to recognize that recording 
broadcasting should be included in the rights granted to a work, as 
indeed done at Rome in 1928, than to recognize that the process ofrecor 
or broadcasting was itself "literary" or "artistic" .59 True, by RBC B 
1948 these doctrinal objections concerning cinematographs and photograp 
had been sufficiently overcome to allow these works to be included within t 
definition of "literary and artistic works" in Art. 2(1) of that text. Similar! 
at Stockholm 1967 an amendment assimilating "works expressed by a pto 
analogous to cinematography" to cinematographic works was added 
Art. 2(1) to encompass television broadcasts; Art. 2(2), giving states a discr 
tion whether or not to require fixation in material form as a condition 
protection, permits live telecasts to qualify under Art. 2(1).60 Care 
58 RICKETSON, supra note 39. The "Preliminary Report", supra note 1 (ch. 7, p. 3) states ... 
"[t]here is a debate whether sound recordings are covered by separate conventions and; 
therefore not subject to Berne." 
59 Moves to include "radiophonic works" in Art. 2 and to grant protection to records aS 
"original works" in Art. 13 were defeated at Rome: LADAS, supra note 3, paras. 110, 198. 
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es such as these, adopted only after long debate, cannot be used to 
tstrap" other classes of work into Art. 2(1) by spurious analogy. 
conclusion is supported by the travaux preparatoires of RBC Brussels 
. At that Conference, L' Association Litteraire et Artistique Inter-
nale (ALAI) asked the International Bureau to recommend to the Con-
ce that phonograms and broadcast works be added to the list of matters 
erated in Art. 2(1). In their joint report to the Conference, the Bureau 
Belgium refused to make this recommendation, not because these mat-
were already within the broad language of the Article, but because they 
enot and should not be. As for phonograms, the Report stated that these 
s were not produced by human intelligence and do not engage the crea-
activity that legislation dealing with authors' rights protects. This was not 
ary or artistic but industrial work: it certainly deserves protection but 
a different regime. As for broadcast works, the danger was that the 
would be commissioned by a broadcast organization which would mis-
nly be thought to be the author. In short, both a human "author" and 
the intellectual creativity implicit in a literary or artistic work were 
ired before items could fall under the RBC. 61 No participant at Brussels 
nted from this view. On this point, the Continental notion of "author's 
t", which recognizes the special social and legal position of the author, 62 
WIPo, supra note 32, vol. 2, at pp. 1177-1178, 1153 ("Rapporteur's Report"). A proposal 
simply to add "televisual works" to Art. 2(1) failed: id., 863 et seq., 891. 
Telefilms may be protected under RBC Brussels as works analogous to cinematographs: 
DUBIN, "Motion Picture Rights: United States and International" 28 So. Cal. L.R. 205, at 
211 (1955); ULMER, supra note 46, at 4 ("[w]hether telefilms are true films or analogous 
productions may remain an open question"). The experts at RBC Stockholm 1967 were not 
so sure on the point and thus recommended amendments to the text specifically to include 
telefilms: WIPO, supra note 32, vol. 1, at 85-86. 
1 "Documents", supra note 45, at 140-141, 154-155; see also note 59, supra. Similarly, at 
RBC (Berlin 1908), the protection claimed by sound recording and piano roll manufactur-
ers was considered to be in the realm of "droit industriel" rather than of literary and artistic 
works: "ii ne pouvait des lors etre introduit des dispositions a cet egard dans la presente 
Convention": "Proces-verbaux" contained in "Correspondence Respecting the Revised 
Convention of Berne for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed at Berlin, 
November 13, 1908", Cd. 4467 (1909, London), at p. 106 (declaration of Belgian delega-
tion); see also "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Law of Copyright Committee", Cd. 
5051 (1909, London), at pp. 128, 130-131 (evidence of Georges Maillard, President of 
ALAI) . 
. 62 The position in France is typical: "[n]o doubt, an inexperienced or unknowledgeable sound 
engineer will reach a quite different result from an expert and highly qualified specialist; but 
the act of recording itself is a mechanical, automatic operation, whereas the pen, like the 
[violinist's] bow, sits lifeless without human hand, or rambles under the control of a child or 
madman." DESBOIS, supra note 29, para. 187 (the identical paragraph appears in the 3rd ed. 
(1978)) [my translation]. See also RosEN, "Artists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution, 
an American Revolution" 2 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 155 (1983). 
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prevailed over the pragmatic British notion of "copyright". 63 Not u 
1961 Rome International Convention for the Protection of Performe 
ducers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations did broadcast 
record producers obtain protection, and then only under the guise of" 
voisins" ("neighbouring rights") to authors' rights. 64 
The view that records and broadcasts are outside the RBC is supporte 
British,65 Australian,66 New Zealand67 and Canadian68 committees co 
63 See text supra accompanying notes 7-8. Assertions that no philosophical differences 
between Continental and British notions of copyright (e.g., RECHT, "Le Droit d' 
une nouvelle forme de propriete" (1969, Paris), 19-20) conveniently ignore the 
sound recordings. Thus, unlike many Continental countries and despite evidence that 
works were not literary or artistic works under RBC (Berlin 1908) (see "Minutes of 
dence", supra note 61), Britain had no qualms in assimilating sound recordings tom 
works: Copyright Act 1911 (U.K.), s. 19(1); a course followed by other British C 
wealth countries, e.g., Canada (Copyright Act 1924, now R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, s. 4( 
64 Moreover, Art. 1 of the 1961 Rome Convention states that the protection under the 
vention "shall leave intact and shall in no way affect the protection of copyright in lit 
and artistic works", thereby clearly making a distinction between the subject-matter 
present Convention and "literary and artistic works". The discussion on this Article 
Conference emphasizes the distinction between an author and the performer of a 
who is not regarded as an author: lLO/UNEScolBIRPr, "Records of the Diplomatic 
ence on the International Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograrns and B 
casting Organizations, Rome, 10 to 26 October 1961" (Belgium, 1968), at 79-81. 
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized D 
tion of Their Phonograms (1971) also distinguishes between "authors" and "perfo 
producers of phonograms": see preamble and Art. 7; also UNESCO/WIPo, "Records of 
International Conference of States on the Protection of Phonograms" (Paris, Gen 
1975), at p. 37 (para. 24 of "General Rapporteur's Report"). 
65 "Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs" (the "Whit 
Report"), Cmnd. 6732 (1977), para. 44. 
66 "Report of the Committee appointed by the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth 
consider what alterations are desirable in the Copyright Law of the Commonwealth" ( 
"Spicer Report"), (Govt. Printer, Canberra, 1959), para. 285. 
67 "Report of the Copyright Committee" (the "Dalglish Report"), (Govt. Printer, Wellin 
1959), paras. 73, 280. 
68 ROYAL COMMISSION ON PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS, 
"Report on Copyright" (1957, Ottawa) ("the lLsLEY Report"), at 76; KEYES & BRUNET, 
"Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a Revision of the Law" (1977, Consumer & Corporate 
Affairs Canada), at 21; CONSUMER & CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA/DEPARTMENT OF COM: 
MUNICATIONS, "From Gutenberg to Telidon: A White Paper on Copyright" (1984), at 4 
(broadcasts); "The Charter", supra note 5, at 50-51 (sound recordings), 58-59 (broad~ 
casts). 
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sion of their copyright laws. It is also supported by most commen-
and seems plainly right. 
ams (i.e., video-tapes and discs) may qualify as photographs or 
graphs; alternatively, as works "produced" (Rome 1928, Brussels 
r "expressed" (Paris 1971) by a process "analogous to" photography 
matography. Commentators claim, correctly,70 that this would be a 
nab le interpretation" of the RBC. 71 
ers were not regarded as "authors" at the RBC (Rome 1928 and 
Is 1948) Conferences. Performers' rights were debated but not made 
bject of a Convention provision: only to a voeu requesting members to 
the possibility of protecting them. 72 Performers might well be consid-
artists, but they only interpreted an existing work and did not create a 
one. Protection they might deserve, but not as "authors". 
"WIPO Guide", supra note 3, at p. 17; MAK, "Rights Affecting the Manufacture and Use of 
Gramophone Records" (Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), at 148; LADAS, supra note 3, at 425; 
-OSTERTAG, supra note 38, at 41; ULMER, supra note 41, at 21 ("this is undisputed today") 
(but see text infra accompanying notes 120 et seq.); KLAVER, supra note 54, at 164 (phono-
grams), 165 (broadcasts); DAVIES, "Piracy of Phonograms" (1981, ESC Publishing, 
Oxford), para. 5.5.2; BucK, "Copyright, Harmonization & Revision: 'International Con-
ventions on Copyright Law'" 9 Int. Bus. Lawyer 475 (1981); NESGOS, "Canadian Copyright 
Law and Satellite Transmissions" 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 232, at 236 (1982) (broadcasts); 
"Nimmer on Copyright" (1985, Matthew Bender), para. 17.06[A] (sound recordings); 
STRASCHNOV, "Le Droit d'Auteur et !es Droits connexes en Radiodiffusion" (1948, Brus-
sels), 61-62 (sound recordings); STRASCHNOV, "Protection internationale des 'droits voi-
sins"' (1958, Brussels), 37. 
The Rome 1928 formula is adopted in the Canadian Copyright Act 1924, but commentators 
have suggested that a Canadian court might not hold videograms covered under the Act: 
PERRY, "Copyright in Motion Pictures and Mechanical Contrivances" 5 C.P.R.(2d) 256, at 
266 et seq. (1972); KEYES & BRUNET, supra note 68, at 82. A dramatic work embodied on 
videotape has however been protected: Tom Hopkins Int'! Inc. v. Wall & Redekop Realty 
Ltd [1984] 5 W.W.R. 555, aff don this point 20 D.L.R.(4th) 407 (Brit. Col. C.A., 1985). 
1 GLOVER, "Emerging International Copyright Laws on Off-the-Air Home and Educational 
Video-Recording: An Analysis" 28 Bull. Cop. Soc. 475, at 483-484 (1981); KLAVER, supra 
note 54 (but see comments in text supra accompanying this note); STEWART II, supra note 
39, at 278. 
72 RAESTAD, supra note 30, at 242-245 (RBC Rome); "Documents", supra note 45, at 
308-313, 428 (RBC Brussels). 
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It was not until the 1961 Rome Convention73 that performers, alon 
broadcasters and record producers, were granted protection, butt 
"neighbouring rights", not authors' rights. British, Australian and Can 
copyright committee reports74 and most commentators75 correctly co 
that performers have no rights under the RBC. 
( d) Published Editions 
Publishing a new edition of an existing work is not an act of "autho 
any more than is the recording of a piece of music; there is no crea 
arranging or laying out an existing work. 76 The edition is therefore 
ject to the national treatment requirements of Art. 5(1) of the RBC. 
( e) Computer Programs 
[AJ!though many agree that the Berne Convention definition [in RBC (P 
1971) Article 2(1)] could fairly naturally be applied to programs, it is har 
make a legal case that it clearly must apply, as it was drafted at a time when 
one was thinking about computer programs, much less about the possib" 
that they might require some special treatment. 78 
73 See text supra following note 58; also notes 50 and 64. ULMER, supra note 46, at p. 9, 
that performers would necessarily have less extensive rights than true authors, 
practical reason for excluding the former from the RBC: "The high level of c 
protection which has been achieved nationally and internationally in the Countries 
to the Berne Convention can be maintained only if the circle of authors is kept 
certain limits." 
74 "Whitford Report", supra note 65; "Spicer Report", supra note 66; KEYES & 
supra note 68, at 82; "The Charter", supra note 5, at 56-57. 
75 OSTERTAG, supra note 38, at 43; PINNER (ed.), "World Copyright" (1953, Leyden), 
at 1050 (Mentha); MAK, supra note 69, at 109; KLAVER, supra note 54, at 162 ("more 
universally-held opinion"); ULMER, supra note 41, at 21-22 (semble); BUCK, supra n 
Cf LADAS, supra note 3, at para. 199. 
76 LADAS, supra note 3, at 425; STRASCHNOV, "Protection internationale", supra note 
37; MAK, supra note 69, at 148 ("surely, nobody would rank as an author [thep · 
book]!"). 
77 "The Charter", supra note 5, at 16. 
78 KARJALA, "Lessons from the Computer Software Protection Debate in Japan'' 53 
L.J. 53, at 78, n. 55 (1984) (emphasis in text); also KARNELL, "Copyright in 
Programs - An International Survey" [1985] E.I.P.R. 126, at 128 (the RBC 
"demand protection for computer programs"). Similarly, "The Charter", supra n 
p. 45 referred to the "unclear status of computer programs internationally" and 
mended a regime of protection based on reciprocity; but note that Canadian co 
recognized programs as literary works under the current 1924 Canadian Act: see 
infra. 
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recent comment is typical of the differing views currently held on the 
of computer programs under the RBC. 79 To some extent, despite its 
ary protestations, the World Intellectual Property Organization 
O) itself may have unintentionally contributed to the confusion by pre-
g its 1978 Model Provisions on the Protection of Computer Software. 80 
ggesting norms such as a shorter term of protection different from those 
r the RBC, the Model Provisions might be read as implicitly admitting 
the RBC does not apply to programs. Subsequently, experts repre-
"ng both RBC and UCC states and meeting under the aegis of WIPO, 
some indecision, cautiously accepted that the RBC may, not must, 
to programs. 81 
puter program is initially written by a human programmer, initially 
haps using flow charts (drawings),82 but eventually as a series of instruc-
s (source code) to be inserted into a computer. The computer transforms 
source code into machine code, a corresponding series of electric 
ses that may interact with an existing program or with the computer's 
tral processing unit to achieve a desired result. Either before, but most 
FLAM.EE, "Aspects actuels de la protection juridique du logiciel au regard du droit beige" 75 
Rev. de Droit Int. L'Ing. Cons. 313, at 325-334 (1985). Those favouring protection include 
BRETT & PERRY (eds.), "The Legal Protection of Software" (ESC, Oxford, 1981), at 93 et 
seq. Stanc); KINDERMANN, "Computer Software and Copyright Conventions" [1981] 
E.l.P.R. 6; GoTZEN, "Les Programmes d'Ordinateurs Comme Objet de Droits Intellec-
tuels" 71 Rev. de Droit Int. L'Ing. Cons. 241, at 245-247 (1981); BISHOP, "Legal Protection 
of Computer Programs in the United Kingdom" 5 Nw. Jo. Int. Law & Bus. 269, at 272 
(1983); KEPLINGER, "Authorship in the Information Age - Protection for Computer Pro-
grams under the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions", Copyright (1985), 119, at 
126-128. 
The provisions are set out in PERRY, "The Legal Protection of Computer Software - The 
WIPO Model Provisions" [1979] E.I.P.R. 34, at 36-37. 
See BRAUBACH, "Computer Software International Protection" [1980] E.l.P.R. 225. The 
Report of the WIPO International Bureau to the First Session of this meeting states of the 
RBC position: "it seems to be generally accepted that computer software could .enjoy 
copyright protection, provided that the conditions of copyright law are fulfilled" (Doc. 
LPCS/1/2, Nov. 30, 1979, para. 8). The Report adopted by the Expert Group is just as 
cautious: "despite the fact that the existing international convention[s] were not specifically 
designed to grant protection to computer software, an attempt should nevertheless be made 
to on those conventions as much as possible to avoid the need to prepare a new treaty, 
whose objectives were covered - at least partly - by existing conventions, particularly the 
Berne Convention." (Doc. LPCS/I/4, para. 42, Nov. 30, 1979). Similarly, the 1983 WIPO 
meeting: see Note, "WIPO: Legal Protection of Computer Software" 17 Jo. World Trade 
Law 537, at 538-539 (1983). 
The following discussion does not deal specifically with flow-charts, which should have no 
difficulty being protected as "artistic works" (drawings) under the RBC. With this change, 
the discussion of source and object code applies equally to such drawings. 
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likely after, the machine code is generated, it can be represented by an 0 
code, a bina1I or hexadecimal form of the source code understandable 
programmer. 3 The machine code may be embedded or stored either 
porarily or permanently in a material support such as silicon chip, m 
tape or disc. It is imperceptible and unintelligible to humans, though it 
be physically represented and printed out in its corresponding object c 
Source and object code should qualify as protected works under the 
Under RBC (Paris 1971) Art. 2(1), "literary and artistic works" in 
"every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, wha 
may be the mode or form of its expression". If the code qualifies as a "lite 
work", it is irrelevant that its expression is in alphanumeric, hexadecimal 
binary notation: the code is a "production" and the RBC expressly makes 
"mode or form" of the work's "expression" irrelevant. The key questi 
whether it is a "literary work" by an "author". 
The work seems to be created by an "author" in the traditional sense: 
sonal intellectual creativity of an order far greater than many otherprote 
works (letters, simple drawings, photographs) is required to produce a 
gram. 84 Its form is literary: the notation of source and object codes is visu 
perceptible and readily comprehensible by other programmers versed in 
language. That the codes may lack aesthetic appeal is irrelevant: so do m 
technical drawings, letters and plastic works of geography, topography 
science that, as specific examples of protected works dating from the.Ori · 
BC 1886, undoubtedly qualify for protection. The purpose for which 
work is eventually intended, to drive or interact with a machine, should 
disqualify the work; as the examples of technical drawings and plastic w 
indicate, the function or purpose to which a work is put or intended 
irrelevant under the RBC. 85 
83 A human may transform source code to object code, but the availability of 
programs designed to do this mechanically make this an unlikely event because of its 
inefficiency and practical uselessness. Whether the translation involves the creative a 
an "author" is irrelevant, since the originality involved in creating the source code 
equaiiy support the object code. 
84 Despite a 1985 German decision anomalously requiring something akin to novelty in 
patent sense rather than originality for a computer program to qualify as a copyright w 
SCHROEDER, "Copyright in Computer Programs - Recent Developments in the 
Republic of Germany" [1986] E.I.P.R. 88. at 89-90. 
85 "WIPO Guide", supra note 3, at 13; ULMER & KOLLE, "Copyright Protection of Co 
Programs" 14 IIC 159, at 170-171 (1983); George Hensher Ltd v. Restawile Uph 
(Lanes.) Ltd [1975] R.P.C. 21, at 68-69 (H.L.); Cuisenaire v. South West Imports 
supra note 57, at 506. 
Some source codes published in computer magazines may have been produced as an in 
lectual exercise, without the programmer intending personaiiy to use them. A s 
inquiry into the programmer's intent should not be a prerequisite to eligibility for co 
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'ne code however presents a problem. It may be embodied in a silicon 
that has been preceded by making a number of circuit diagrams, that are 
etched and layered as "computer masks" into a chip. The diagrams may 
, as artistic works86 but, in this form or as computer masks, will prob-
.fall within the sub-category of works of applied art. Applied art, always 
blem area under the RBC, 87 is not subject to mandatory protection at 
if it does not, as diagrams or chips probably do not, comprise industrial 
s or models: RBC (Paris 1971) Art. 2(7) gives states a discretion as to 
far their law should protect such items. If the item is protected as an 
ed artistic work, RBC (Paris) Art. 7(4) (but not any version of the RBC 
and including Brussels 1948) requires a minimum of 25 years protec-
hine code that is embedded or stored either permanently or temporarily 
support but that is not itself preceded by any other work other than 
and object code presents a more major problem. Is machine code a 
ary work" or a "production in the literary [or] scientific domain"?88 This 
age seemingly implies that a work must comprise humanly perceptible 
intelligible symbols, which electric impulses decidedly are not. 89 Even if 
objection is not fatal, the process of converting source or object code into 
hine code does not involve "authorship" and is less "literary" or "scien-
' work than the process of sound recording which, for the purposes of the 
, belongs to the mechanical rather than creative arts. 90 Ulmer and Kolle 
to overcome this difficulty by regarding the process of program creation 
composite whole. They then compare it with the process of film-making, 
ing how the assembly of many creative inputs produces a final product 
HART, "Legally Protecting Semiconductor Chips in the United Kingdom" [1985] E.I.P.R. 
258, 261. Cf. "Preliminary Report", supra note 1, ch. 13, at pp. 6-8 (n.). 
Text supra accompanying note 36. 
A Canadian court has so held in an interlocutory decision dealing with this precise language 
embodied ins. 2 of the Canadian Copyright Act R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, taken directly from 
the equivalent language of Art. 2 of the RBC (Rome 1928): La Societt~ d'Informatique 
R.D. G. Inc. v. Dynabec Ltee [1984] C.S. 1189, aff d 6 C.P.R. (3d) 322 (Que. C. A., 1985). 
This objection recently prevailed before a 3: 2 majority of the High Court of Australia, 
which held that machine code embodied in a chip did not qualify as a "literary work" under 
the domestic copyright law: Computer Edge Pty. Ltd v. Apple Computer Inc. (May 6, 
1986); but see now infra note 96. In a companion case in Canada, a trial court did not accept 
that these objections prevented machine code from being a translation or reproduction in 
material form of source or object code: Apple Computer Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd 
(April 29, 1986, Fed. Ct.). The cases were decided virtually contemporaneously without 
reference to one another; indeed, the Canadian court partly relied on the intermediate 
Australian appellate decision (53 A.L.R. 225 (1984)) reversed by the Australian High 
Court. 
90 Text supra accompanying notes 58 et seq. 
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perhaps more creative than the sum of its parts. 91 The analogy, tru 
issue of creativity, is false on the question of other elements ofprot 
a cinematographic film is a protected category of work, whereas 
question with machine code is whether it is protectible and, if so, as 
of work. As the case of sound recordings again demonstrates, itis 
possible for copyright works (e.g., music and lyrics) to be used in the 
of an ultimately non-copyright work, where the latter (the recor 
not qualify as the literary or artistic work of an author.92 Even if, u 
the sound recorder is the same person as the music composer and Iy 
the music and lyrics have been composed specifically for the purpose 
recorded, this does not change the nature of the act of recording and re 
a protected work. 
There seems equal difficulty in considering machine code a translation 
tation, alteration or reproduction in any manner or form93 of source or 
code: the requirement of humanly perceptible and intelligible symbols 
seem to apply to the derivative work as well as the original work. Ag 
same reasons as prevent a sound recording being a translation or 
vation from the underlying musical work under the RBC94 apply e 
machine code. Of course, if a state voluntarily legislates that con 
source or object code (a protected work) into machine code is a 
reserved to the author, this right should qualify for national treatment 
Art. 5(1).95 
The discussion above has ignored the practical results intended 
achieved by the operation of machine code. The program may be 
example, to present an audio-visual display such as a videogame. 
seems no reason why this result should not qualify as an artistic and/or 
cal work expressed in a particular mode or form, despite its fluctuati 
transitory character and the need for further human intervention to pr 
the display. The product is well within the ontological and teleologicaf 
ception of artistic and musical works. The involvement of a new inst 
ality, the computer, in the translation of a kinetic artistic/musical cone 
to the screen should be viewed simply as a technological development 
the traditional arts. 
91 Supra note 85, at 173-174. 
92 Text supra accompanying notes 58 et seq. 
93 RBC (Paris 1971) Arts. 2(3), 9(1). The Australian Apple case refused to treat machin'e. 
as such versions: supra note 89. The Canadian Apple case (id.) however did hold ma 
code a translation or reproduction in material form of source or object code 
similar Canadian Act. 
94 OSTERTAG, supra note 38. 
95 Text infra accompanying notes 102 et seq. 
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practice seems to be recogni~ing computer programs in .so~rc.e, .object 
achine code as protectable hterary works. Among the 1unsd1ctions to 
are "copyright" countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, 
lia and South Africa,% as well as "authors' rights" countries such as 
y, France, Holland and Japan. 97 To the extent that these states pro-
ational treatment for these works beyond the parameters suggested in 
tudy, it seems that they act voluntarily and the works will be outside 
Art. 2(1) and thus the national treatment requirements of the RBC. To 
tent, however, that domestic laws grant rights beyond those required 
RBC to authors of works protected by Art. 2(1), these rights should 
der the national treatment requirements of RBC Art. 5(1). 
oubt, computer programs were not envisaged at the BC's inception nor 
g later revisions up to at least Brussels 1948. When their importance 
to be appreciated, special types of protection may have been thought 
ally, economically or socially more desirable than a regime of author's 
But this is irrelevant to whether programs or their results fall wholly or 
Uy under Art. 2(1) of the RBC as a matter of interpretation. This 
le's language has always been kept open-ended precisely in order to 
race new sorts of work as technology, taste and ideas develop. 
United Kingdom: the Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985 (U.K.) now 
assimilates programs to literary works, a policy the U .K. government proposes to continue: 
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, "Intellectual Property and Innovation" (Cmnd. 
9712, 1986), para. 9.3. 
Canada: Apple Computer Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd, supra note 89; I.B.M. Corp. 
v. Ordinateurs Spira/es Inc. 12 D.L.R. (4th) 351 (Fed. Ct., 1984); see also supra note 88. 
Australia: Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (No. 43) includes computer software as pro-
tected work. Machine code created prior to the effective date of this amendment however 
has been refused copyright protection: supra note 89. 
South Africa: Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v. Rosenstein 1981 (4) S.A.L.R. 
123. 
7 Germany: Copyright Amendment Act of June 23, 1985, equating programs with literary 
works: SCHROEDER, supra note 84. 
France: the Law of July 3, 1985 (No. 85-660, Art. l.V), clearing up prior conflicting 
decisions, expressly confers copyright protection on programs, prompting a commentator 
to suggest that the assimilation provisions of Art. 5(1) apply to them: ToUBOL, "The 
Protection of Computer Programs in France" [1986] E.I.P.R. 15, at 16. 
Holland: KARNELL, supra note 78, at 132; ULMER & KOLLE, supra note 85, at 167, n. 24c. 
Japan: Law for Partial Amendments to the Copyright Law, No. 62 of June 14, 1985, 
granting software copyright protection; see KARJALA, "Protection of Computer Programs 
under Japanese Copyright Law" [1986] E.I.P.R. 105, also indicating that three prior deci-
sions had held similarly. 
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ureau headed by the Director General. This also has the advantage for the 
e Union that a large efficient office is available to carry out its resolu-
s and tasks. The Union as such is maintained. I would like to close with 
wish that in the future, in a world in which technology plays a paramount 
and countries belong to different groups depending on their social and 
litical structure, the Berne Union still adheres to its tradition and remains 
uniting force for the protection of works of literature and art. 
e National Treatment Requirements of the Berne 
and Universal Copyright Conventions 
Part Two** 
4. RBC Rome 1928, Art. 19: an Exception to National Treatment? 
The discussion up till now has not mentioned a possible problem for states 
bound by RBC Berlin 1908 or Rome 1928. Under Art. 19 of those texts: 
"The provisions of the present convention shall not prevent a claim being 
made for the application of any wider provisions which may be made by the 
legislation of a country of the Union in favour of foreigners in general." This 
confusing Article, first introduced in RBC Berlin 1908, was eventually 
amended at Brussels 1948 by removing the final words, "in favour of for-
eigners in general", after an attempt to do so at Rome in 1928 failed. 98 
Read literally, Art. 19 suggests that RBC membe:J;s can claim rights greater 
than the RBC minima only when the other RBC forum extends such protec-
tion to "foreigners in general" .99 If the legislation simply grants greater rights 
• B. A., LL. B. (Hons.) (Auckland), J. D. (Chicago); Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, Toronto. 
•• Part One of this article was published in 17 ITC 577 (1986). 
98 RAESTAD, supra note 30, at 229; LADAS, supra note 3, at 190 et seq. Some minor inconse-
quential drafting changes were made to Art. 19 at Stockholm 1967, principally the substitu-
tion of "greater" for "wider" before "protection". 
99 "Documents'', supra note 45, at pp. 105, 379. 
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